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Abstract
This paper analyzes optimal slot allocation in the presence of airport
congestion. We model peak and o¤peak slots as vertically di¤erentiated
products, and congestion limits the number of peak slots that the airport
can allocate. Ine¢ ciency emerges when the airport does not exploit all
its slots. We show that for a private airport, ine¢ ciency may arise if the
airport is not too congested and the per-passenger fee is small enough,
while with a public airport it does not emerge. Furthermore the airport,
irrespective of its ownership, tends to give di¤erent slots to ights with
same destination if the underlying market is a duopoly, and a single slot
if the underlying market is served by a monopoly.
JEL classication: R41; H23; H21.
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1 Introduction
Over the past decades, airline tra¢ c growth has outpaced capacities at many
of the worlds major airports.1 As a result, airport congestion has become a
major issue faced by many airports worldwide. Airport congestion is likely to
get worse in the coming decades, being generated by an expanding demand due
to increase of income, and the growth of some developing countries.2
In the analysis of airport congestion, the economic literature focused mainly
on congestion pricing(for which carriers pay a toll according to their contri-
bution to congestion) as a regulatory tool to deal with congestion.3 However,
despite its theoretical feasibility, congestion pricing has not been practised in
the real world. By contrast, slot allocation is the usual approach to management
of congestion at airports. According to IATA World Scheduling Guidelines, a
slot is the permission given by a managing body for a planned operation to
use airport infrastructure that is necessary to arrive or depart at a airport on a
specic date and time.4 Under a slot system, the airport authority determines
the total number of slots to make available, and slots are distributed among the
airlines according to some allocation rule.5 Given the prevalence of slot systems,
a theoretical analysis investigating the interaction between slot allocation and
congestion seems highly policy relevant.
In this paper we analyse endogenous slot allocation in the presence of airport
congestion, and we investigate the conditions under which the allocation choice
is ine¢ cient. We refer to a slotas the permission granted to a certain airline
to use airport infrastructure for a planned operation at a specic time window
1For instance, over half of Europes 50 largest airports have already reached or are close
to their saturation points in terms of declared ground capacity (Madas and Zografos, 2008).
2The European Commision estimated that half of the worlds new tra¢ c will come from
Asia Pacic region in the next 20 years. They expect that air tra¢ c in Europe will roughly
double by 2030, and that 19 key airports will be at saturation. See MEMO/11/857.
3For an early contribution on congestion pricing see Levine (1969). Recent representative
studies include Brueckner (2002, 2005). Under congestion pricing, carriers could place as
many ights as they wish provided they pay the toll, thus the overall level of congestion is
determined by airline decisions.
4See Worldwide slot guidelines.
5For example, FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) capped peak hour ight movements
at New York La Guardia, J.F.Kennedy, and Neward airports. As for Chicagos OHare
airport, FAA persuaded two major airlines United and American Airlines to reduce peak
ight activities while prohibiting smaller airlines from increasing ights to ll the gap.
2
of the day.6 We examine a setting where an airport wants to maximize the
number of passengers, and sorts slots according to di¤erent departure ights,
while airlines compete in the ights market. As in Brueckner (2002), we model
peak and o¤-peak slots as products of di¤erent qualities in a model of vertical
di¤erentiation.7 Peak slots are congested, mirroring the situation of capacity
shortages at peak hours faced by many airports. We analyze both a private and
a public airport being restricted to levy a uniform per-passenger fee for ight
activities, this being pre-determined by administrative bodies.8 We consider
separately the case where two ights towards a same destination (denoted as
pairwise ightsin the paper) are served by two airlines, and where they are
served by a monopoly. In this complete information setting, airlines know the
total provision of slots and the fact that each participating airline receives a
single slot. Finally, we dene as allocative ine¢ ciencythe situation in which
not all the slots available are exploited.
Because peak slots are preferred by passengers to o¤-peak slots, the airports
slot assignment creates an exogenous quality di¤erential between the carriers
when the assigned slots are for di¤erent periods. The carriers compete condi-
tional on this quality di¤erential, and the resulting prices and passenger volumes
therefore depend on the slot assignments. Depending on parameter values, the
total passenger volume (and hence fee revenue for the airport) could be higher
when the airport withholds a peak slot that it could allocate to the carries,
leaving the slot unused and the airports peak capacity thus not fully exploited.
This outcome is ine¢ cient from societys point, but it is a possible feature of
equilibrium in the model.
6Though in practice congestion is not exclusively conned to runway congestion, and might
embody other capacity dimensions such as environmental concerns, we nevertheless focus on
runway congestion.
7Our approach di¤ers from Brueckner (2002) as follows. In Brueckner (2002)s framework,
a monopoly airport chooses the critical points on the continuum that respectively dene
whether to y or not and whether to y in peak slots or o¤-peak slots. Focusing on nding
the optimal congestion pricing, he implicity assumes that airport capacity is su¢ cient to meet
peak hour demands. Unlike Brueckner (2002), our interest stems from the scarcity of peak
hour slots. Thus we focus on the allocation instead of using the pricing tool.
8The analysis of a private airport also seems relevant. Although airports have long been
owned by governments, there has been a signicant worldwide trend towards government fa-
cilities privatization beginning from the middle of the 1980s. Following the United Kingdom,
many major airports in Europe, Australia and Asia have followed suit and have undergone pri-
vatization or are in the process of being privatized. In principle, privatization is characterized
by the transfer of ownership structure from state-owned to private enterprises.
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When the airport is private and each destination is served by a duopoly
airline market, the results depend on whether the number of slots is lower
than the number of destinations (the airport is busy) or not (the airport is
not too busy). A busy airport uses all the available peak slots to implement
peak/o¤-peakconguration. The results are driven by di¤erentiation which,
on the one hand, increases the number of passengers, but on the other hand
softens competition. The rst e¤ect more than outweighs the second e¤ect, thus
the airport prefers to adopt di¤erentiation rather than to allocate both peak
slots for the same destination.
A not-too-busy airport chooses its allocative strategy according to the amount
of per-passenger fee. In particular, it implements a mix of peak/o¤-peak
and peak/peak market conguration if the per-passenger fee is high, and
peak/o¤-peakconguration in each market if the per-passenger fee is low. In
the latter case, given that the number of destinations is lower than the num-
ber of slots, allocative ine¢ ciency emerges. These results can be explained as
follows. Low per-passenger fees imply cheap ight tickets, thus the airport can
allocate slots in the peak/o¤-peak conguration without losing passengers, even
with less competition. Allocative ine¢ ciency is due to the fact that a not-too-
busy airport does not need the extra slots to reach the optimal slot allocation.
With high per-passenger fees, the airport allocates some peak/peak market con-
guration (undi¤erentiated slots) in order to induce more competition and to
keep the price of ight tickets su¢ ciently low.
The emergence of allocative ine¢ ciency in our results corresponds to the
common practice in airport management of declaring a number of slots be-
ing lower than an airports full capacity (Mac Donald, 2007, and De Wit and
Burghouwt, 2008). Indeed, as De Wit and Burghouwt (2008) point out, an ef-
cient use of the slots at least requires a neutral and transparent determination
of the declared capacity.
If each destination is served by a monopolist and one peak slot is assigned
to them, the monopoly airline would choose to operate in the peak slot only,
thus leaving unused the o¤-peak slot. Indeed, given the same (marginal) per-
passenger fee for operating at a peak or o¤-peak hours, the airline prefers to
put all seats in the peak ight. Moreover, if two peak slots are assigned to
the monopoly airline, and assuming a preference for operating one ight at
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peak slot rather than two (for operating costs not modelled here), then the
monopoly airline would also leave unused the extra peak slot. In turn, the
airport would assign a single peak slot to each destination market, as long as
peak slots are available. Naturally, in this case allocative ine¢ ciency does not
occur. Finally, the results are similar when the airport is public, with the
exception than ine¢ ciency does not emerge.
To illustrate the empirical relevance of this mechanism, we have briey in-
vestigated the slot allocation in the city-pair markets of the 5 most busiest US
airports and of a random sample of 10 mid-range US airports (see Appendix A).
Table 1 shows the numbers of origin-destination routes operated by monopoly,
duopoly and oligopoly, and the pattern of slot occupancy. While a large bunch
of city-pair service is supplied by monopoly airlines, there exists a signicant
portion of ight activity served by competing airlines.
# Origin-destinations served by # Slots occupation(%)
Mon. (%) Duo. Olig. Peak o¤peak
Top 5 525 (62%) 161(19%) 157(19%) 29% 71%
Mid sized 10 200 (73%) 53 (20%) 19 (7%) 28% 72%
Table 1. Pattern of market structure and slot occupation.
Our theoretical analysis claims that slot allocation can be used by congested
airports as a discrimination tool in markets where several rms compete. To
highlight this, we focus on duopoly city-pair markets and construct an index I
that measures whether the competing airlines are put in the same slot. Typi-
cally, along the discussion in Section 3, two competing airlines, each operating
one ight to the same destination, are allocated in the same time slot if I = 0
and are separated in a peak and an o¤-peak slot if I = 1. A higher aggregated
index I measures stronger use of a slot discrimination. Excluding inter-hub
tra¢ c and high frequency destinations, we then nd evidence consistent with
our model prediction that slot discrimination is stronger in the largest airports,
see Table 2
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Average Index I
Largest 5 airports Mid 10 airports
5-11pm 0.38 0.23
11-16pm 0.32 0.2
16-23pm 0.44 0.44
Table 2. Average index I:
So far, slot allocation has drawn relatively little interest in the economic
literature, with few but noteworthy contributions. Barbot (2004) models slots
for airline activities as products of either high or low quality, and carriers choose
the number of ights they operate. She shows that slot allocation improves
e¢ ciency according to the criteria for assessment, and welfare in fact decreases
after re-allocation. Unlike the present paper, in Barbot (2004)s model carriers
could operate as many ights as they want. Our paper limits the number
of peak slots, in order to address congestion. Verhoef (2008) and Brueckner
(2009) compare the pricing and slot policy regimes. They show that the rst
best congestion pricing and slot trading/auctioning generate the same amount
of passenger volume and total surplus. They investigate a single congested
period. Their contributions do not distinguish between peak and o¤-peak hours,
and allow the airport to allocate slots without charges. Although this seems
a plausible description of some public airports, non-prot behavior does not
seem likely for a private airport. Departing from Verhoef (2008) and Brueckner
(2009), we assume that each airline operates a single ight. Our approach
models certain time intervals that are most desired by all passengers as the
peak period. In particular, the total number of slots that an airport could
grant in the peak period does not meet the demand of passengers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model. Section 3 presents the baseline results, in which the airport is assumed
to be private and an airline duopoly serves each destination. Section 2 and 5
show the changes in the results when either a monopoly airline serves for each
destination or the airport is publicly owned, respectively. In section 6, we show
the changes in the results when density is heterogenous among di¤erent ights.
Section 7 concludes.
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2 The model
In the baseline model, we consider a private airport that links N destinations
d 2 D.9 Each destination is served by two ights f and f 0 2 F operated by in-
dependent airlines.10 There are therefore 2N ights and 2N airlines (#(D) = N
and #(F) =2N). Formally, we dene the mapping I from ights f to destina-
tions d such that I(f) = d. The inverse mapping from ights to destinations is
dened as A(d) = ff : I(f) = dg. We assume that airports at destinations are
uncongested, so that the allocation decisions do not a¤ect the ight scheduling
of destination airports. Furthermore, we focus on the case of single trip depart-
ing ights. Return trip ights can be dealt with by either an identical analysis
with two runways, or simply by adding a scale factor if there is a single runway.
Destinations are independent in the sense that they are neither substitutes nor
complements; therefore the demand for one destination is irrelevant to demands
for other destinations. We assume that the quality di¤erential is characterized
only by the departing time. Although the quality of an airline depends on many
factors, this approach allows us to concentrate on the congestion issue. There
are two travel periods, denoted as peak and o¤-peak. A peak period represents
the time window that consists of the most desirable travel times in a day, for
instance early morning and late afternoon. The peak period may contain a
collection of disjoint time intervals like 7:00-9:00 and 17:00-19:00. The o¤-peak
period, by contrast, contains all other time intervals that do not belong to the
peak period. In order to address the problem of peak slots congestion, the o¤-
peak period is assumed to be uncongested, i.e., airport capacity can serve all
ights in o¤-peak time intervals. Conversely, the peak period is congested in
the sense that airport capacity cannot serve all ights within peak period. This
assumption captures tra¢ c patterns at many airports nowadays. All potential
passengers agree that peak hours (denoted as subscripts h for higher quality)
are more preferable than o¤-peak hours (denoted as subscripts l for lower qual-
ity) at an equal price. At peak hours the demand to use airport runways is
much higher than o¤-peak hours, so that the perceived qualitiesof slots, sl
and sh, satisfy exogenously sh > sl > 0. Finally, a slot allocation is dened as
9Section 5 analyses the case with a public airport.
10Section 4 extends the analysis to the case where a private airport interacts with airline
monopolies.
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the mapping g from airline f to a slot type i, g : F ! fl; hg, so that g(f) = i.
For instance, g(f) = h reads as airline f is allocated a peak time slot.
We assume that in each destination market the airlines engage in (seat)
quantity competition.11 We denote pfii0 as the price charged for ight f ying
to destination d = I(f) that takes o¤ at slot i while its competitor on the same
destination takes o¤ at slot i0, i; i
0
= fl; hg. Similarly, qfii0 denotes the number
of passengers served by this ight. Following the general framework of vertical
di¤erentiation (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979), in each destination market the
demand is generated from a unit mass of passengers indexed by a type parameter
v. Passengers di¤er in tastes, the taste parameter is described by v 2 [0; 1], v
being uniformly distributed with unit density. We assume each passenger ies
at most once, and, if a passenger refrains from ying, her reservation utility is
zero. Formally, a potential passenger in the destination market d with ights f
and f 0, d = I(f) = I(f 0), has the following preferences:
Ud =
8>>><>>>:
vsi   pfii0 if she takes ight f in slot si at price pfii0
vsi0   pf 0i0i if she takes ight f 0 in slot si0 at price pf
0
i0i
0 if she does noty.
Without loss of generality, suppose g (f 0) = h and g (f) = l. Pairwise ights
obtain slots of di¤erent qualities. Under our assumption, ight f 0 obtains a peak
slot, while ight f obtains an o¤-peak slot, so that i0 = h and i = l. It follows
that the passenger with a taste parameter v ies with f 0 when vsh   pf 0hl >
vsl  pflh > 0 and ies on ight f when vsl  pflh > vsh  pf
0
hl > 0. The passenger
indi¤erent between f 0 and f has taste
vhl =
pf
0
hl   pflh
sh   sl : (1)
Likewise, a passenger is indi¤erent between not ying and ying with airline f
when vsl   pflh = 0; so that
vlh =
pflh
sl
: (2)
11The assumption of quantity competition is common in the airline economics literature.
See Brueckner (2002), Pels and Verhoef (2004). Brander and Zhang (1990) nd empirical
evidence that the rivalry between duopoly airlines is consistent with Cournot behavior.
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Figure 1: Valuation of slot quality
Hence with di¤erentiated ights, the demand for ight f 0 is 1   vhl; while the
demand for ight f is vhl  vlh (see Figure 1). Moreover, there are v passengers
that do not y.12
For g(f 0) = g(f) = i 2 fh; lg; i.e., pairwise ights obtain slots of same
quality, then a passenger is indi¤erent between ights. In this case, the pairwise
ights are homogeneous and hence evenly share the destination market. There
are two possible congurations: both ights obtain either peak or o¤-peak slots.
In the peak/peak conguration, a passenger v is willing to y when
v  vhh  p
f
hh
sh
 
=
pf
0
hh
sh
!
; (3)
while in the o¤-peak/o¤-peak conguration, she is willing to y when
v  vll  p
f
ll
sl
 
=
pf
0
ll
sl
!
: (4)
The demand for each ight is thus 1
2

1  pi
si

. Hence the three congura-
12Motta (1993) shows that Cournot competition can be studied only with partial market
coverage, since the demand function can not be inverted with full market coverage.
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tions are characterized by the following demand functions, respectively:
(i)
8>><>>:
qflh(p
f
lh; p
f 0
hl) =
pf
0
hl   pflh
sh   sl  
pflh
sl
qf
0
hl(p
f
lh; p
f 0
hl) = 1 
pf
0
hl   pflh
sh   sl ;
(5)
(ii) qfll(pll) + q
f 0
ll (pll) = 1 
pll
sl
; (6)
(iii) qfhh(phh) + q
f 0
hh(phh) = 1 
phh
sh
: (7)
Solving (5)-(7) for prices, the inverse demand functions corresponding to the
three possible destination market structures are given respectively as follows:
(i)
8<:p
f
lh = sl

1  qflh   qf
0
hl

pf
0
hl = sh

1  sl
sh
qflh   qf
0
hl

;
(8)
(ii) pll = sl

1  qfll   qf
0
ll

; (9)
(iii) phh = sh

1  qfhh   qf
0
hh

: (10)
Airlines choose the number of seats in order to maximize prots. Airline
costs include airport per-passenger charge , while marginal operating costs are
normalized to zero.13 We do not consider the entry of airlines in the airport and
assume that xed costs are sunk. Thus the prot of a ight f competing in the
destination market d with another ight f 0, d = I(f) = I(f 0), is given by:
flh =

pflh(q
f
lh; q
f 0
hl)  

qflh if g(f) = l and g(f
0) = h (11)
f
0
hl =

pf
0
hl(q
f
lh; q
f 0
hl)  

qf
0
hl if g(f) = h and g(f
0) = l;
13In Section 3.2 we also consider positive operating costs. These have been assumed in
some contributions, such as Pels and Verhoef (2004), Brueckner and Van Dender (2008), and
Basso (2008).
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for an peak/o¤-peak slot conguration and
fii =

pfii(q
f
ii; q
f 0
ii )  

qfii if g(f) = g(f
0) = i 2 fl; hg (12)
f
0
ii =

pf
0
ii (q
f
ii; q
f 0
ii )  

qf
0
ii if g(f) = g(f
0) = i 2 fl; hg
for the peak/peak and o¤-peak/o¤-peak slot conguration.
The airport earns the charge  for each passenger. It chooses the slot allo-
cation mapping g() that maximizes its prots. We get the following program:
max
g()
 = Nd=1

qfg(f);g(f 0) + q
f 0
g(f 0);g(f)

where I(f) = I(f 0) = d; (13)
subject to the peak slot capacity constraint
#ff : g(f) = hg M; (14)
where M is the total number of peak slots. To avoid a cumbersome discussion
of ties, we assume that M is even. Constraint (14) implies that the overall
allocated peak slots cannot exceed the total number of available peak slots. Peak
capacity cannot accommodate all ights (M < 2N), while o¤-peak capacity can
accommodate all ights (there is no constraint for the o¤-peak slots).
We then dene allocative ine¢ ciency as follows.
Denition 1 Allocative ine¢ ciency emerges when at least one peak slot is not
used.
This denition seems natural. In the presence of airport congestion, leaving
some peak slots unused represents a degree of ine¢ ciency.
Figure 2 shows the timing of the game. In the rst stage the airport allocates
peak and o¤-peak slots for a given fee . In the second stage airlines choose
number of seats to supply qfii0 based on the slot allocation. In the third stage
passengers in each destination decide whether to y with a peak period airline,
an o¤-peak period airline, or not to y at all. The equilibrium concept is the
subgame perfect equilibrium.
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Figure 2: Timing
3 Results
In this section we show the baseline results of the model. As mentioned earlier,
we rst focus on a private airport that links destinations operated by duopoly
airlines with symmetric demand and cost structures. We rst discuss the com-
petition between the airlines and then the optimal slot allocation the airport.
3.1 Duopoly airlines
In the second stage, airlines set their optimal supply of seats. We analyze each
possible conguration (peak/o¤-peak; peak/peak; o¤-peak/o¤-peak) separately.
Consider rst a destination market d where pairwise ights (f; f 0) = A(d) obtain
di¤erent slots. Then according to (11), airlinesprots are expressed by:
flh =
h
sl(1  qflh   qf
0
hl)  
i
qlh (15)
f
0
hl =

sh   slqflh   shqf
0
hl   

qhl: (16)
Airlines choose the number of seats to maximise prots, for any given .
The rst-order conditions are:
@flh
@qflh
=  + (1  qflh   qf
0
hl)sl   qflhsl = 0; (17)
@f
0
hl
@qf
0
hl
=  + sh   2qf 0hlsh   qflhsl = 0: (18)
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Solving (17) and (18) simultaneously with respect to qflh and q
f 0
hl yields:
qflh = qlh 
shsl    (2sh   sl)
(4sh   sl)sl ; (19)
qf
0
hl = qhl 
2sh     sl
4sh   sl : (20)
To ensure interior solutions, we assume the condition 0 <  < 1  shsl
2sh   sl .
Note that qlh < qhl for all 0 <  < 1. If a destination market obtains di¤erent
slots, then the airline with the peak slot serve more passengers in equilibrium
than its o¤-peak competitor. Since quantities are symmetric across destinations,
prices and prots are also symmetric and we can dispense the variables with
the superscripts f and f 0 in the sequel without loss of clarity. Plugging (19)
and (20) into (8) yields
plh =
sh(2+ sl)
4sh   sl ; (21)
phl =
2s2h + (3sh   sl)  shsl
4sh   sl ; (22)
both of which are positive, and where
phl   plh = (sh   sl) (sh + 2)
4sh   sl > 0:
Naturally, prices are functions of ; with @plh
@
; @phl
@
> 0.
Since qlh < qhl and plh < phl; the airline ying during the peak slot earns
higher prot than its o¤-peak slot counterpart.
Consider next the optimal number of seats provided in the same destination
d market where both airlines (f; f 0) = A(d) obtain the same slots. The airlines
face the demand
qfii + q
f 0
ii = 1 
pi
si
: (23)
Plugging (23) and (25) into airline prots (12) yields:8<:
f
ii =
h
(1  qfii   qf
0
ii )si   
i
qfii
f
0
ii =
h
(1  qfii   qf
0
ii )si   
i
qf
0
ii :
(24)
13
The rst order conditions of fii and 
f 0
ii with respect to q
f
ii and q
f 0
ii ; respectively,
are: 8<:   q
f
iisi + si(1  qfii   qf
0
ii ) = 0
   qf 0ii si + si(1  qfii   qf
0
ii ) = 0:
By solving the above two equations for qfii and q
f 0
ii we obtain the optimal number
of seats served by two airlines, which are identical due to symmetry:
qfii = q
f 0
ii = qii 
si   
3si
: (25)
To ensure interior solutions, we make the assumptions 0 <  < si and si > 1;
i 2 fh; lg. Again quantities are symmetric across destinations so that prices
and prots are symmetric and can be dispensed with the superscript f and f 0.
Hence 0 <  < 1 is a su¢ cient condition for qlh; qhl; qii to be positive. For all
0 <  < 1; we have qhl > qhh > qll > qlh . Plugging (25) into (24) and (10)
yields:
pll =
sl + 2
3
; phh =
sh + 2
3
: (26)
Again, prices are functions of ; with @pii
@
> 0.
3.2 Airport
In the rst stage, the airport maximizes its prot by allocating peak slots subject
to congestion. In this set-up, destination markets can have only three types of
slot allocations: n1 destination markets have peak/o¤-peak allocations, n2 get
peak/peak allocations and n3 receive o¤-peak/o¤-peak allocations. The airport
allocation problem (13) simplies to the following linear program:
max
n1;n2;n3
[n1 (qlh + qhl) + 2n2qhh + 2n3qll] (27)
subject to
n1 + n2 + n3 = N (28)
n1 + 2n2 M (29)
0  n1; n2; n3  N: (30)
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where N denotes the number of destinations, 2N the number of ights, and
M the number of available peak slots. The rst constraint checks the count
of destination markets while the second one expresses the airport peak slot
capacity. The optimal slot allocation depends on how the number of passengers
in each type of slot allocation (qlh+ qhl, 2qhh and 2qll) compare with each other.
According to (19) and (20), the number of passengers in a destination market
is given by
qlh + qhl =
sh(3sl   2)  s2l
sl(4sh   sl) ; (31)
whereas with conguration peak/peak, or o¤-peak/o¤-peak, the number of pas-
senger in a destination market is
2qii =
2(si   )
3si
; i 2 fh; lg: (32)
To get intuition, consider that the capacity constraint (29) is not binding. Re-
allocation of ights must satisfy only the constraint (28). The airport can re-
organize the slot in three ways. First it can add a peak/o¤-peak conguration
at the expense of an o¤-peak/o¤-peak conguration (i.e. n1 = 1, n3 =  1).
Since sh > sl > 0; the additional number of passengers is given by
qlh + qhl   2qll = (sh   sl) (2+ sl)
3sl (4sh   sl) > 0;
Second, it can add a peak/peak conguration at the expense of the same o¤-
peak/o¤-peak conguration (i.e. n2 = 1, n3 =  1) and gain
2qhh   2qll = 2 (sh   sl)
3shsl
> 0
passenger. As a result, the o¤-peak/o¤-peak conguration should never be
chosen by the airport. Finally, the airport may substitute a peak/o¤-peak
conguration for an peak/peak conguration (i.e. n1 = 1, n2 =  1) and
gain (qlh + qhl)  2qhh passengers. Using (31) and (32), this gain is shown to be
positive if and only if
  2  slsh
6sh   2sl
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Figure 3: Passenger seats to a destination in each slot conguration
where
1   2 = sl (2sh   sl)
2 (3sh   sl) > 0:
At low airport fees , the number of passengers is larger when the ights to
the same destination are di¤erentiated in their departure times. The opposite
holds for high fees. There are two forces in this setting. On the one hand,
competition is softer under peak/o¤-peak conguration as each airline targets
either the high or low valuation passengers. In equilibrium they o¤er seats to
low costpassengers. On the other hand, airlines intensively compete for the
same high valuation passengers under a peak/peak conguration. While they
attract more consumers with high valuation they do not reach the low cost
ones. As a consequence, when the airport fee  is small enough ( < 2), ight
fares remain su¢ ciently low to attract many low valuation passengers. The
rst e¤ect outweighs the second e¤ect, so that qlh + qhl is greater than 2qhh.
The airport then has an incentive to separate departing schedules. By contrast,
if the airport fee  is large ( > 2), the ight fares are too high to attract
many low valuation passengers. The airport favors high valuation passengers
and o¤ers the most valued departure slot to all of them.
Figure 3 plots number of passengers qlh + qhl; qhh + qhh and qll + qll as the
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fee  2 (0; 1) varies. The o¤-peak/o¤peak conguration is always dominated.
When  is small ( < 2) the airport gets a larger number of passenger in a
peak/o¤-peak conguration qlh + qhl than with a peak/peak one qhh + qhh.
Consider now that the airport hits its capacity constraint (29). Feasible slot
changes must then satisfy n1 =   (n2 +n3) and n2 = n3.14 For the
sake of clarity, consider a slot re-allocation such that n1 = 2, n2 =  1 and
n3 =  1, which involves two destination markets and four slots, including
two peak and two o¤-peak slots. The airport uses the slots of two peak/peak
and o¤-peak/o¤-peak destinations and re-allocate only one peak slot to each
destination. Doing this, it increases the number of passengers by 2 (qlh + qhl)
and decreases it by 2qhh and 2qll. The comparison yields:
(qlh + qhl)  (qhh + qll) = (sh   sl) [shsl   (2sh   sl)]
3shsl (4sh   sl) > 0 for  < 1:
As a result, when the airport reaches its capacity, it always benets from allo-
cating peak/o¤-peak slot congurations. This e¤ect can be visualized in Figure
3 comparing qlh + qhl and qhh + qll.
The formal solution of the program (27) is derived in Appendix B as it
follows:
(i) n1 = minfM;Ng; n2 = 0; n3 = N   n1 if  < 2;
(ii) n1 =M , n2 = 0 and n3 = N  M if 2 <  < 1 and N M ;
(iii) n1 = N   n2; n2 =M  N; n3 = 0 if 2 <  < 1 and M > N:
When the airport is below capacity (M > N) and imposes a low fee ( < 2),
it grants a single peak slot for all destinations (n1 = N in (i)). This reects
the above incentive to set peak/o¤-peak slot congurations. However, in this
case, some peak slots are ine¢ ciently discarded whereas they have a value to
all passengers. As mentioned above, by di¤erentiating the departure time the
airport increases the number of low costpassengers. Thus the airport does
not internalize the passengers value. By contrast, for higher fees, it grants
a rst peak slot to all destinations and a second one to M   N destinations
(n1 = N + (N  M) and n2 =M  N in (iii)). In this case ight fares are too
14The constraints yield n1 = 2N  M   2n3 and n2 =M  N + n3.
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high to attract the low costpassengers and the airport prefers o¤ering the
best departure times to the maximum number of passengers.
When the airport is at capacity (N M) and imposes a low fee ( < 2), it
gives a single peak slot for the maximum number of destinations and allocates
the rest of destinations into the o¤-peak slot pool (n1 = M , n3 = N  M in
(iii)). The airport makes exactly the same decision for higher fees (n1 = M ,
n3 = N  M in (ii)).
The foregoing discussion can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose all destination markets are served by duopoly airlines
and the airport is private. For M  N , the airport uses all available peak slots
and implements the peak/o¤-peak conguration in each destination market.
For M > N and
  2 (0; 2], the airport does not use all available peak slots (ine¢ ciency),
and the conguration is peak/o¤-peakin each destination market;
  2 [2; 1), the airport uses all available peak slots, and implements
(M  N)peak/peakand (2N  M) peak/o¤-peakconguration.
Figure 4 describes the equilibria in the space (;M). When  2 [2; 1) ; the
airport favors peak/peak allocations and as a consequence no peak slots would
be optimally left unused. For per-passenger fees smaller than 2, the result
depends on the relationship between peak slots M and number of destinations
N . In a very busy airport where available peak slots are scarce relative to total
demand (M  N), it is optimal to allocate all available peak slots. When peak
slots are not scarce relative to the number of destination markets (M > N),
a private airport would leave a number of peak slots unused when the pre-
determined fee is small, thereby resulting in allocative ine¢ ciency. In reality,
such behavior may be expressed by misreporting true airport handling capacity.
This is in line with De Wit and Burghouwt (2008), who nd that e¢ cient slot
use can be a¤ected by capping available slots through capacity declaration.
3.3 Airline operating costs
For the sake of completeness, we end the section by discussing the case where
airlines have non-zero operating costs c > 0. The analysis can be developed
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Figure 4: Equilibria: duopoly airlines and private airport
in a similar vein as before, where the airline marginal cost is now c +  rather
than  only. Naturally, in both congurations the volume of passengers is larger
without operating cost. The conclusion drawn from the comparison of peak-o¤
peak conguration also applies here. It follows that, with positive operating
costs airport prot is also smaller in each conguration. The condition required
to guarantee positive passenger volumes in equilibrium is
0 <  < 01 
shsl
2sh   sl   c;
while the threshold determining the preference between peak/peak and peak/o¤-
peak is
02 
shsl
6sh   2sl   c:
Therefore, the above proposition now reads with 01 and 
0
2 substituting for
1 and 2. If the cost c is small enough so that 02 > 0, the proposition
presents the same congurations and the same issue of allocative ine¢ ciency.
The conguration peak/o¤-peak induces more passenger volume than congu-
ration peak/peak so that the airport does not distribute all available peak slots
and ine¢ ciency arises. However, if c is large enough so that 02 becomes neg-
ative, all available peak slots are distributed and allocative ine¢ ciency never
arises.
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4 Airline monopolies
Having examined competition between duopolists in each destination market,
we shall now investigate the case in which each destination market is served
by a single airline that acts as a monopolist operating two ights. As with
the baseline model, we analyze the second stage in each possible conguration
separately, while the analysis of the third stage remains unchanged.
Suppose that an airline is o¤ered both a peak and an o¤-peak slot. Its prot
is given by  = flh + 
f 0
hl where 
f
lh and 
f 0
hl are dened in (15) and (16). The
airline solves the prot maximization problem with constraints on the positivity
of outputs:
max
qflh;q
f 0
hl
 =
h
sl(1  qflh   qf
0
hl)  
i
qflh + (sh   slqflh   shqf
0
hl   )qf
0
hl (33)
s.t. qflh  0; qf
0
hl  0:
The maximum prot (see Appendix C) is obtained for
qmlh = 0; (34)
qmhl =
sh   
2sh
; (35)
where the superscript m stands for monopoly. The monopolistic airline al-
locates all seats in the peak ight. Indeed, it does not have any advantage to
decrease consumersvalue by o¤ering a ight o¤ peak. This result is due to
the fact that the cost of boarding a passenger (in terms of per-passenger fee)
is linear and equivalent between a peak and an o¤-peak ight. Given the same
(marginal) per-passenger fee, the airline prefers to put all seats in the peak
ight. In the real world, this implies that the monopoly airline assigns a big
airplane ying on that destination in peak time rather than put two small
airplanes ying one in the peak and the other in the o¤-peak slot. Plugging
qmhl =
sh 
2sh
into pmhl yields
pmhl =
sh + 
2
: (36)
Consider next the case where the monopoly airline is o¤ered two slots at the
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same time for the same destination.15 A small (unmodeled here) xed cost per
aircraft movement will entice the airline to operate only one aircraft on one slot.
We denote the slot type (h or l) the monopolist obtains by i. The monopolists
prot is given by:
i = [(1  qi)si   ] qi; with i 2 fh; lg :
Taking the rst-order condition for number of seats we get the equilibrium
number of seats the monopoly would provide:
qmi = q
m
hl 
si   
2si
; (37)
which is the same result as (35) for i = h. The aircraft capacity is larger at
peak time: qmh > q
m
l . To ensure interior solutions, suppose condition 0 <  < sl
is satised. Plugging (37) into (24) and (10) yields:
pmi =
si + 
2
: (38)
which same price as (36) for i = h. It is easy to check that peak ights are
more expensive and transport more passengers.
The airport allocation problem simplies to allocating peak and o¤-peak
slots to the monopoly airlines:
max
m1;m2
[m1q
m
h +m2q
m
l ]
subject to
m1 +m2 = N
m1 M
0  m1;m2  N:
where m1 and m2 are the number of ights in the peak and o¤-peak slots. Since
qmh > q
m
l , the solution is (i) m1 = N if N < M ; (ii) m1 = M otherwise. The
15This conguration is mainly made for the sake of comparison. It is certainly the case in
congurations where there are two (morning and evening) peak slots per day. The case where
the airline merges the two ights is left for future research.
21
airport lls the peak slots until capacity is reached.
Proposition 2 Suppose all destination markets are served by monopoly air-
lines. Then, airlines operate one ight peer destination and the private airport
uses all available peak slots.
Proposition 2 shows that, if the destination market is served by a monopoly
airline, the optimal slot allocation is to assign one peak slot to each destination
market, while no o¤-peak ights operate. The intuition lies in the fact that
the monopoly airline has no incentive in exploiting an o¤-peak slot, given that
same marginal cost as operating during peak hours.
5 Public airport
In this section, we investigate the case of a pubic, welfare-maximizing airport.
This allows us to obtain some insights on how the airports ownership inuences
slot allocation. In this regard, social welfare W is represented by the sum of
airportprots , passenger surplus CS and airlinesprots:
W = + CS + n1 (hl + lh) + 2 (n2hh + n3ll) :
Since airport and airlines operating costs are normalized to zero, airport prots
come from total per-passenger fees, whereas airline prots are the ticket income
less total per-passenger fees paid to the airport. In turn, passenger surplus
is represented by the total gross utility generated from ying minus all ticket
payments. Since monetary transfers between airlines and airport cancel out,
and so do transfers between passengers and airlines, then social welfare equals
the sum of passengersgross utility in all 2N destination markets. Thus W can
be rewritten as:
W = n1
Z vhl
vlh
vsldv +
Z 1
vhl
vshdv

+ n2
Z 1
vhh
vshdv + n3
Z 1
vll
vsldv; (39)
where vlh; vhl, vhh and vll are given by (1), (2), (3) and (4). Note that the
surplus in the peak/peak (resp. o¤-peak/o¤-peak) congurations includes the
value of all consumers from 1 to vhh (resp. from 1 to vll) as all passengers take
the same time slot.
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In destination markets with the peak/o¤peak conguration, the expressionR vhl
vlh
vsldv represents the gross passenger surplus from taking the o¤-peak pe-
riod ight, while
R 1
vhl
vshdv is the gross passenger surplus from taking the peak
period ight in the same destination market. In destination markets with the
peak/peak conguration, the surplus is
R 1
vhh
vshdv;which is the second term on
the right hand side of (39). The last term of (39) thus represents the gross
passenger surplus in destination markets with o¤-peak/o¤-peak conguration.
The analysis of the second and third stage remains the same as in the
baseline model. For notational simplicity we dene Wlh 
R vhl
vlh
vsldv, Whl =R 1
vhl
vshdv, Whh 
R 1
vhh
vshdv and Wll 
R 1
vll
vsldv;so that (39) becomes
W = n1 (Wlh +Whl) + n2Whh + n3Wll:
We will consider rst the case with duopoly airlines and then the case with
monopoly airlines.
5.1 Airline duopolies
Putting (21), (22) and (26) together with (1), (2), (3) and (4) yields:
vlh =
sh (sl + 2)
sl (4sh   sl) ; vhl =
2sh + 
4sh   sl ; vhh =
sh   2
3sh
; vll =
sl   2
3sl
: (40)
Substituting (40) into (39) and solving the integrals yields:
Whl +Wlh =
4shsl(sl   2sh) + shsl (12s2h   5shsl + s2l )  2 (4s2h + shsl   s2l )
2sl(4sh   sl)2 ;
and
Wii =
2(+ si)(2si   )
9si
; i 2 fh; lg:
Assuming  < P  sl
2
ensures that Bii is positive. By comparing the number
of seats obtained in each conguration, we get (see Appendix C) Whh > Whl +
Wlh > Wll > 0 and
(Bhh+Bll)
2
< Bhl+lh. We thus arrive at a situation similar to
the private airport case with  2 [2; 1). In particular:
 n1 =M , n2 = 0 and n3 = N  M if N M (Case (ii)).
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Figure 5: Equilibria: duopoly airlines and public airport
 n1 = N   n2; n2 =M  N; n3 = 0 if M > N (Case (iii)).
The following proposition summarizes the features of the equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Suppose all destination markets are served by duopoly airlines,
and the airport is public. For M  N , the airport uses all available peak slots
and favors peak/o¤-peak conguration. For M > N the airport implements
a mix of (M  N) peak/peakand (2N  M) peak/o¤-peakcongurations.
Figure 5 describes the equilibria in the case of public airport with duopoly
destination markets. The results are qualitatively similar to the case with pri-
vate airport for 2 <  < 1. However, now the public airport would use all
available peak slots in any case, hence, ine¢ ciency does not emerge when the
airport is public. This can be explained as follows. The consumers lose when
they are presented departure time away from their preferences. The public
airport internalizes this loss and avoids empty peak slots. The private airport
rather implement empty peak slots because it can attract more (low valuation)
passengers, even though those passengers would prefer travelling at peak time.
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5.2 Airline monopolies
We now turn to the interplay between a public airport and airline monopolies.
Compared to the private case, the market stage in each destination market does
not change: given the opportunity of operating in peak slots, each monopoly
airline uses one peak slot only. Thus W can be rewritten as:
Wm = m1W
m
h +m2W
m
l ; (41)
where Wmh =
R 1
vh
vshdv; W
m
l =
R 1
vl
vsldv; m1 and m2 are the number of ights
in the peak and o¤-peak slots, and vh and vl are the same as (3) and (4),
respectively, but when only one ight operates. Putting pmh =
sh+
2
and pml =
sl+
2
from (38 into (3) and (4), respectively, yields
vh =
sh + 
2sh
; vl =
sl + 
2sl
: (42)
Substituting (42) into (41) and solving the integrals yields:
Wmi =
(si   )(3si + )
8si
; i 2 fh; lg;
where
Wmh  Wml =
(sh   sl) (3shsl + 2)
8shsl
> 0:
SinceWmh > W
m
l , the solution is (i) m1 = N if N < M ; (ii) m1 =M otherwise.
The airport lls the peak slots until capacity is reached, as in the private case
(with same intuition).
Proposition 4 Suppose all destination markets are served by monopoly air-
lines. Then, airlines operate one ight peer destination and the public airport
uses all available peak slots.
6 Heterogeneous Density
In this section, we assume heterogeneous density across destination markets.
The point is to conrm that peak/o¤-peak slot congurations and allocative
ine¢ ciencies also occur when destination markets di¤er in sizes. For simplicity
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we study an economy with only two destination markets, d 2 D = f1; 2g, that
exhibit di¤erent densities: the small destination market 1 has a lower density
1 , the large destination market 2 has a higher density 2 > 1. We discuss
three examples: the airport allocates either one, two or three peak slots in the
two markets.
To begin with, we rst look at the duopoly case where peak slots are highly
scarce, where one peak slot is available compared to four slot demands, M = 1;
N = 2. Let us label the large market ights by 11; \12 2 A(1) and the small
market ones by \21; \22 2 A(2). There are two ways to allocate the peak slot:
(1) one of the two airlines in the small destination market, and (2) one of the
two airlines in the large destination market.
The demand functions for each airline can be in two possible congurations.
First if the smaller destination market d = 1 has the peak slot we have
q11lh = 1

p12hl   p11lh
sh   sl  
p11lh
sl

; q12hl = 1

1  p
12
hl   p11lh
sh   sl

,
and for destination market 2:
q21ll + q
22
ll = 2

1  p
21
ll
sl

,
(where p21ll = p
22
ll ). Second, if larger destination market d = 2 has the peak slot
we get the same quantities where 1 substitutes for 2 and (q11lh ; q
12
hl ; q
21
ll ; q
22
ll )
is replaced by (q21lh ; q
22
hl ; q
11
ll ; q
12
ll ). In the similar manner with (19), (20) and
(25), we could derive the optimal passenger volumes served by each airline
and consequently each destination market in equilibrium. A comparison of the
equilibrium passenger volumes in the two congurations yields:
q11lh + q
12
hl + q
21
ll + q
22
ll  
 
q11ll + q
12
ll + q
21
lh + q
22
hl

=
(1   2) [sl (9 + sh + 2sl) + 2 (sh   sl)]
3sl(4sh   sl) < 0:
implying conguration 2 yields a higher number of passenger than conguration
1. The ranking in this simple framework suggests
Proposition 5 Consider an economy with two duopolies with di¤erent density
levels, a private airport and a single peak slot. Then the airport allocates the
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peak slot to one of the airlines in the large destination market, and ine¢ ciency
would not arise.
We investigate next the case where peak slots have a moderate scarcity at
the airport. In this setting there are two peak slots available for two destination
markets,M = N = 2. It is straightforward to see that allocation two peak slots
to destination market 2dominates allocation two peak slots to destination
market 1. Indeed, the large market has a bigger multiplier for density 2 >
1. This, together to the fact that o¤-peak/o¤-peak is strictly dominated by
peak/peak and peak/o¤-peak, implies that there are two possible allocations:
(1) two peak slots to the large destination market, and (2) one peak slot to
each destination market. The demand functions for each airline in these two
congurations are:
1. Conguration 1. Destination market 1 :
q11ll + q
12
ll = 1

1  p
11
ll
sl

;
destination market 2:
q21hh + q
22
hh = 2

1  p
21
hh
sh

:
2. Conguration 2. Destination market 1:
q11lh = 1

p12hl   p11lh
sh   sl  
p11lh
sl

; q12hl = 1

1  p
12
hl   p11lh
sh   sl

;
destination market 2:
q21lh = 2

p22hl   p21lh
sh   sl  
p21lh
sl

; q22hl = 2

1  p
22
hl   p21lh
sh   sl

.
Comparing the two congurations we obtain
q11ll + q
12
ll + q
21
hh + q
22
hh  
 
q11lh + q
12
hl + q
21
lh + q
22
hl

> 0
for
 > 3  shsl (1 + 2) (sh + 2sl + 9)
2 (sh   sl) [2 (3sh   sl)  1sh] :
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This result can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 6 Consider an economy with two duopolies with di¤erent density
levels, a private airport and two peak slots. Then, for either 3 > 1 >  or
1 > 3 > , the airport allocates one peak slot to each market; for 1 >  > 3,
the airport allocates two peak slots to the large market, and ine¢ ciency would
not arise.
When the per-passenger fee is su¢ ciently small, the allocation is fair and
does not favor any market so that each destination is equally served. For high
per-passenger fees, the denser market obtains all available slots. As a conse-
quence, passengers in the small market have no chance to y at peak hours,
while passengers in the big market cannot y at o¤-peak hours.
Finally, we examine the example where peak slots are relatively abundant.
In particular, there are three peak slots to be allocated to two markets, M = 3;
N = 2. Given that conguration o¤-peak/o¤-peak is strictly dominated, we
can set aside the situation where the airport leaves one slot unused and gives
two slots to the big market. Indeed, the airport could be better o¤ by giving
the unused one to the small market. It follows that there are three plausible
congurations: (1) two peak slots to market 2- one peak slot to market 1, (2)
two peak slots to market 1- one peak slot to market 2, and (3) one peak slot to
each market.
1. Conguration 1. Market 1 :
q11lh = 1

p12hl   p11lh
sh   sl  
p11lh
sl

; q12hl = 1

1  p
12
hl   p11lh
sh   sl

;
market 2:
q21hh + q
22
hh = 2

1  p
21
hh
sh

:
2. Conguration 2. Market 1:
q11hh + q
12
hh = 1

1  p
11
hh
sh

;
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market 2:
q21lh = 2

p22hl   p21lh
sh   sl  
p21lh
sl

; q22hl = 2

1  p
22
hl   p21lh
sh   sl

;
3. Conguration 3. market 1:
q11lh = 1

p12hl   p11lh
sh   sl  
p11lh
sl

; q12hl = 1

1  p
12
hl   p11lh
sh   sl

;
market 2:
q21lh = 2

p22hl   p21lh
sh   sl  
p21lh
sl

; q22hl = 2

1  p
22
hl   p21lh
sh   sl

.
Comparing the three congurations we obtain
conguration 1 > 2 > 3 when  > 4;
conguration 1 < 2 < 3 when  < 4;
with
4  shsl (sh + 2sl + 9)
2 (sh   sl) (3sh   sl) :
Therefore
Proposition 7 Suppose an economy with two duopolies with di¤erent density
levels, a private airport and three peak slots. Then, for min (1; 4) > , the
airport allocates one peak slot to each market, and leaves one peak slot unused
(ine¢ ciency); for 1 >  > 4, the airport allocates two peak slots to the large
market and one peak slot to the small market.
Proposition 7 implies that when markets have di¤erent consumer densities,
allocative ine¢ ciency would arise if the per-passenger fee is su¢ ciently small.
On the other hand, if the per-passenger fee lies in a certain range, the allocation
outcome is e¢ cient, with the denser market obtaining both peak slots and
the smaller market obtaining one peak slot. Such allocation favors the denser
market, which is a result of airports prot maximizing behavior.
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7 Concluding remarks
We have explored the optimal slot allocation in the presence of airport con-
gestion in a model where peak and o¤-peak slots are modelled as products of
di¤erent qualities in a vertically di¤erentiated setting. Allocative ine¢ ciency
emerges when the airport does not exploit all its slots. In particular in a private
airport, allocative ine¢ ciency may emerge if the airport is not too congested
and the per-passenger fee is small enough. In a public airport, allocative ine¢ -
ciency does not emerge. Furthermore we have found that the airport, regardless
of its ownership, tends to give di¤erent slots to ights with same destination
if the underlying destination market is a duopoly, and one single slot if the
underlying market is served by a monopoly.
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Appendix A
For our empirical illustration, we examine the airline market structure and slot
occupation. Towards this aims, we gather data from 15 US airports websites
on three consecutive weekdays May 18,19 and 20, 2015 for ightsdeparture
information. Weekdays are chosen to exclude irregular inux for air travel
happens on weekends. We adopt the denition for peak load according to
website of OHare International Airport (ORD)16 and apply to all 15 airports.
Our dataset contains airport level observations on air tra¢ c: departure airport,
service airline, destination airport, departure time. Among the 15 primary
airports in our dataset,17 5 airports are the most busiest airports in US by
total passenger tra¢ c, according to ACI (Airports Council International North
America) ranking in calender year 2013. The other 10 mid-sized airports are
taken arbitrarily from the range 30nd-60nd on the same rank, scattered to 9
federal states. We apply the below rules to lter improper observations: (1)
delete all cargo, private jet charter, aircraft Rental Service, etc.; (2) for code
sharing airlines, keep the operating airline and delete all other (code sharing)
partner airlines. The total number of observations used for our analysis is
5990 departure activities, of which monopoly is the primary feature of airline
market. Table 5 shows per airport market structure. Table 1, reported in
the Introduction, lists the numbers of origin-destination routes operated by
monopoly, duopoly and oligopoly, and the pattern of slot occupancy.
16ORD denes 8-9am, 15-16pm, 17-18pm, and 19-22pm as peak hours.
17FAA denes a primary airport as having more than 10,000 passenger boardings each year.
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Airport #Mon. #Duo. #Olig. Rank(2013)
Atlanta International Airport (ATL) 148 33 25 1
Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) 46 31 32 2
OHare International Airport (ORD) 101 45 51 3
Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) 144 20 18 4
Denver International Airport (DEN) 86 32 31 5
Kansas City International Airport (MCI) 29 11 3 35
Oakland International Airport (OAK) 24 7 0 36
John Wayne Airport (SNA) 17 3 1 38
Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport (SJU) 21 6 6 43
San Antonio International Airport (SAT) 24 5 2 45
Indianapolis International Airport (IND) 28 5 2 48
Kahului Airport (OGG) 10 4 5 51
Bu¤alo Niagara International Airport (BUF) 15 4 0 55
Jacksonville International Airport (JAX) 18 5 0 56
Eppley Aireld (OMA) 14 3 0 60
Table 5. Per airport market structure
A further deletion was made to exclude all ights between the 5 largest
airlines, as they are mostly inter-hub connection ights; and high frequency
ights with frequency above and equal to 7 ights towards one destination
airport. We then construct an index to measure allocative discrimination:
I =
xah   xbh+ xal   xbl 
2
2 f0; 0:5; 1g;
where the subscripts h and l denote peak and o¤peak time slots. xah is a dummy
that takes value 1 if airline a obtains a peak slot, 0 if not. The same logic applies
to nbh; x
a
l and x
b
l : Hence when I = 1;allocative discrimination is largest, while,
when I = 0; allocative discrimination doesnt exist. A higher average value of
this index indicates a higher magnitude of slot discrimination. We then nd
evidence consistent with our model prediction that allocative discrimination
over 10 smaller airports is smaller than that of the larger 5 airports, see Table
2 in the Introduction.
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Appendix B
Linear programming
In this section we describe the general problem of the airport without getting
into the specic cases considered in the paper. The result of each case will
depend on the relationship between M and N and the level of per-passenger
fee . This will be examined and linked to the general solution in the next
section. We dene asQ1; 2Q2 and 2Q3 the equilibrium number of passengers in a
peak/o¤-peak, peak/peak and o¤-peak/o¤-peak conguration, respectively, for
a general problem. The airport has the following linear programming problem
to solve
max
n1;n2;n2
 = n1Q1 + 2n2Q2 + 2n3Q3;
s.t.
n1 + n2 + n3 = N;
n1 + 2n2 M;
0  n1; n2; n3  N:
Using n3 = N   n1   n2 we can re-write
P  max
n1;n2;n2
 = n1 (Q1   2Q3) + n2(2Q2   2Q3) + 2NQ3 ;
s.t.
n1 + 2n2 M ;
0  n1 + n2  N :
We get the following solution:
1. If (Q1   2Q3) > 0 and (2Q2   2Q3) > 0, and Q1 > 2Q2 then n1 =
minfM;Ng, n2 = 0, n3 = N   n1;
2. If (Q1   2Q3) > 0 and (2Q2   2Q3) > 0, and Q2 + Q3 > Q1 then n2 =
minfM=2; Ng, n1 = 0, n3 = N   n2;
3. If (Q1   2Q3) > 0 and (2Q2 2Q3) > 0, 2Q2 > Q1 > Q2+Q3 andN M ,
then n1 =M , n2 = 0 and n3 = N  M ;
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4. If (Q1   2Q3) > 0 and (2Q2   2Q3) > 0, 2Q2 > Q1 > Q2 + Q3 and
M > N > M=2, then n1 = 2N  M , n2 =M  N and n3 = 0;
5. If (Q1   2Q3) > 0 and (2Q2   2Q3) > 0, 2Q2 > Q1 > Q2 + Q3 and
M=2 > N , then n1 = 0, n2 =M=2 and n3 = N  M=2.
6. If (Q1   2Q3) < 0 and (2Q2 2Q3) > 0, then n2 = minfM=2; Ng, n1 = 0,
n3 = N   n2.
7. If (Q1   2Q3) < 0 and (2Q2   2Q3) < 0, then n1 = n2 = 0 and n3 = N .
8. If (Q1   2Q3) > 0 and (2Q2   2Q3) < 0, then n1 = minfM;Ng, n2 = 0,
n3 = N   n1.
Note that Solution 5. is not applicable because we assumed M < 2N:
Applications
The relevant results of the linear programming depend on the structure of the
economy (public/private airport, and duopoly markets), the relationship be-
tween peak slots M and destinations N , and the level of per passenger fees .
What follows helps to understand which solution applies to each case considered
in the paper.
Duopolies and private airport
For the duopoly case, let Q1 = q
f
lh + q
f 0
hl , Q2 = q
f
hh and Q3 = q
f
ll. We know that
Q1 > 2Q2 > 2Q3 for  < 2 and 2Q2 > Q1 > 2Q3 for 2 <  < 1. Also,
Q1 > Q2 +Q3. If  < 2 we get Q1 > 2Q2; so that checking Section 7 result 1.
applies: n1 = minfM;Ng, n2 = 0, n3 = N   n1;
If 2 <  < 1, we get:
i. if N > M , then n1 =M , n2 = 0 and n3 = N  M ;
ii. if M > N > M=2, then n1 = 2N  M , n2 =M  N and n3 = 0 ;
Checking the corresponding results in Section 7, this yields the solution:
 n1 = minfM;Ng; n2 = 0; n3 = N   n1 if  < 2 or if 2 <  < 1 and
N > M ;
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 n1 = 2N  M;n2 =M  N; n3 = 0 if 2 <  < 1 and M > N:
Duopolies and public airport
For the duopoly case, let Q1 = Bhllh, Q2 = Bhh=2 and Q3 = Bll=2. We know
2Q2 > Q1 > 2Q3 if  < P1 and 2Q2 > 2Q3 > Q1 if  > 
P
1 . Also, Q2+Q3 > Q1
for  > P4 .
Checking the corresponding results in Section 7, this yields the following
solution: for  > P1 , we have (result 6.) n2 = minfM=2; Ng, n1 = 0, n3 =
N   n2. For P1 >  > P4 ; we have (result 2.) n2 = minfM=2; Ng, n1 = 0,
n3 = N   n2. For  < P4 ; then the relationship between destinations and peak
slots matters. ForM > N; the solution (result 4.) is n1 = 2N M , n2 =M N
and n3 = 0. For N > M; result 3. occurs, according to which n1 = M , n2 = 0
and n3 = N  M .
Appendix C
Monopoly airlines
The Lagrangian of problem (33) and its derivatives write as
L =
h
sl(q
f
lh   qflhqflh   qf
0
hlq
f
lh)  qflh
i
+ (shq
f 0
hl   slqflhqf
0
hl   shqf
0
hlq
f 0
hl   qf
0
hl)
+ flhq
f
lh + 
f 0
hlq
f 0
hl
@L
@qflh
= sl(1  2qflh   2qf
0
hl)  + flh
@L
@qf
0
hl
= sh   2slqflh   2shqf
0
hl   + f
0
hl
where lh  0 and hl  0 are the Khun-Tucker multiplicators. The Hessian
matrix is
H =
"
 2sl  2sl
 2sl  2sh
#
;
with determinant 4sl (sh   sl) > 0. Therefore H is denite positive and we have
unique maximum.
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The unique root of
@L
@qflh
=
@L
@qf
0
hl
= 0 is given by
qflh =  
1
2sl (sh   sl)

sh   sl   shfhl + slf
0
hl

;
qf
0
hl =
1
2 (sh   sl)

sh   sl + f 0hl   fhl

The maximum solution flh  0, qflh  0; lhqflh = 0, and f
0
hl  0, qf
0
hl  0;
f
0
hlq
f 0
hl = 0. Suppose 
f
lh = 0 and 
f 0
hl = 0 while q
f
lh  0 and qf
0
hl  0. Then, we
get qflh =  12 sl < 0 and q
f 0
hl =
1
2
, which is impossible for  > 0. Hence the two
ights f and f 0 are not operated together. Suppose flh > 0 and 
f 0
hl = 0 while
qflh = 0 and q
f 0
hl  0. Then, we get qf
0
hl =
1
2sh
(sh   ) and fhl =  sh slsh > 0;which
is possible for sh > . Suppose 
f
lh = 0 and 
f 0
hl > 0 while q
f
lh  0 and qf
0
hl = 0.
Then, we get qflh =
1
2sl
(sl   ) and f 0hl =   (sh   sl) < 0, which is impossible.
Suppose flh > 0 and 
f 0
hl > 0 while q
f
lh = 0 and q
f 0
hl = 0. Then, we get
flh =  sl +  and f
0
hl =  sh + , which is impossible for  < sl.
Public Airport
Duopoly
By comparing the number of seats obtained in each conguration, we get:
Bhh  Bll = 2 (sh   sl) (
2 + 2shsl)
9shsl
> 0;
Bhh  Bhl+lh =
(sh   sl) (s2hsl (20sh + sl) + 4shsl (2sh + sl) + 2 (36s2h   19shsl + 4s2l ))
18shsl(sl   4sh)2 > 0
Bhl+lh  Bll =
(sh   sl) (108s2hsl + sl (8s2l   4sl  132) + sh (282   65s2l   8sl))
18sl(sl   4sh)2 > 0;
Hence we obtain Bhh > Bhl+lh > Bll for all 0 <  <
sl
2
:
Next, we evaluate the di¤erences in the allocation of two peak slots:
Bhh +Bll   2Bhl+lh =
37
(sh   sl) ( slsh (44s2h   33shsl + 4s2l ) + 4slsh (2sh + sl) + 2 (4s2h   3slsh + 2s2l ))
9shsl(sl   4sh)2 < 0
for all 0 <  < sl
2
: Hence, Bhh +Bll < 2Bhl+lh.
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